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Abstract: Any satisfactory epistemology must account for the 
distinction between propositional  and doxastic justification. 
Can infinitism account for it? Proposals to date have been 
unsatisfactory. This paper advances a new infinitist account 
of the distinction. The discussion proceeds as follows. Sec-
tion 1 sets the stage. Section 2 presents Peter Klein’s account. 
Section 3 raises a problem for Klein’s account and suggests 
an improvement. Section 4 raises a further challenge. Sec-
tions 5 – 7 consider several unsuccessful attempts to meet 
the challenge.  Section 8 presents my new proposal,  which 
can meet the challenge. Section 9 concludes the discussion.
1. Preliminaries
Epistemologists standardly distinguish propositional from doxastic 
justification.  Some  proposition  might  be  justified  for  your  even 
though you don’t actually believe it, or believe it for the wrong reas-
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ons, or believe it for the right reasons but in the wrong way. Call 
this type of justification propositional justification. It attaches 
to propositions relative to individuals. Doxastic justification at-
taches to concrete belief states (and doxastic states more generally). 
For your belief that Q to be doxastically justified, Q must not only 
be justified for you, but you must believe Q for the right reasons and 
in the right way. Knowledge requires doxastic, not merely proposi-
tional, justification.1
An adequate theory of justification must account for this dis-
tinction. Can infinitists account for it?
Infinitism has been around since at least Aristotle’s time. But 
compared to its main non-skeptical competitors,  foundationalism 
and coherentism, its resources remain largely underdeveloped and 
its potential benefits unappreciated. Through a series of papers over 
the last decade, Peter Klein has done more than anybody to revive 
infinitism’s fortunes, thrusting it back onto the philosophical scene 
(e.g. Klein 1999; Klein 2005a; Klein 2007a).2 So let’s begin with his 
account of the distinction.
2. Klein’s Account
We  can  encapsulate  Klein’s  account  as  follows.  Here  and 
throughout, understand each reason to be unique, so that no two Rs 
with distinct subscripts are identical.
1 See Turri (forthcoming) for further discussion.
2 Fantl 2003 gives an importantly different argument for infinitism.
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Infinitist  propositional  justification (IPJ):  The 
proposition Q is  propositionally justified for you just 
in case there is available to you at least one infinite 
non-repeating series of propositions (or reasons) such 
that R1 is a good (and undefeated) reason to believe Q, 
R2 is a good (and undefeated) reason to believe R1, R3 
is a good (and undefeated) reason to believe R2, . . ., 
Rm + 1 is a good (and undefeated) reason to believe Rm, 
for  any  arbitrarily  high  m.  (Klein  2005a,  135  –  6; 
Klein 2007a: 8, 11; compare Klein 2005b: 166)
Infinitist doxastic justification (IDJ): Your belief 
that  Q  is  doxastically  justified just  in  case  Q  is 
propositionally  justified  for  you,  and  you  have 
provided  enough  reasons  along  at  least  one  of  the 
infinite  non-repeating series  of  reasons,  in virtue  of 
which Q is propositionally justified for you, to satisfy 
the contextually determined standards.3
A few more words about Klein’s positive view are in order. First, 
knowledge requires doxastic justification (Klein 2007b, 158). This is 
3 Says Klein (2007a, 10): “The infinitist will take the belief that p to be 
doxastically  justified for  S  just  in  case S  has  engaged in  providing 
‘enough’ reasons along an endless path of reasons.” Notice that Klein 
says providing the reasons is both necessary and sufficient for doxastic 
justification. In response to Bergmann (2007), Klein (2007b, 26) indic-
ates he might be willing to add that doxastic justification requires S’s 
belief to be “based on” the justifying reasons. But he also suggests 
that basing is tantamount to there being “an available reason” that 
you “cite . . . as a reason” for your belief, so it remains unclear how 
this potential revision affects his theory.
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uncontroversial. Second, doxastic justification requires you to actu-
ally  go through  the  process of  justifying  your  belief.  It  must  be 
earned, much as an income or honest reputation is earned—at least 
for most of us (Klein 2005b, 158, 163, 170). This is controversial but 
I will  not question it here (see Leite 2004 for discussion). Third, 
contextual standards determine what is admissible as a “bedrock” 
reason—a reason that, once you reach it, you are permitted to stop 
(Klein 2007a, 10 – 12; Klein 2005b, 170 – 1). Crucially for the infin-
itist,  it  is  always  possible  to  properly  challenge  ad infinitum the 
contextual standards and thereby the erstwhile bedrock reason, al-
though this never actually happens. Contextualism is  very contro-
versial, but I will not question it here because I want to see whether 
Klein’s view granted in its entirety can adequately account for the 
distinction between propositional and doxastic justification.
3. An Improvement
I will now suggest an improvement to IDJ. My motivation is not 
that  we  can  dream up  fanciful  counterexamples—as  though  that 
would be surprising. Rather, IDJ seems to omit something  funda-
mentally important.
Meet Samira. Samira knows that Q. Under our assumptions it 
follows that Samira’s belief is doxastically justified, so Samira has 
produced enough reasons along at least one infinite non-repeating 
series to satisfy the contextually determined standards. For simpli-
city suppose that Q is propositionally justified for Samira in virtue 
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of only  one infinite non-repeating series of reasons, and for con-
venience call this series ‘Z’. (Nothing that follows depends essen-
tially on this assumption; it merely simplifies greatly my presenta-
tion.) Again for simplicity suppose further that the contextually de-
termined standards require Samira to produce the first three reas-
ons  along  Z  (again,  nothing  depends  essentially  on  this 
assumption), which are:
R1, R2, R3.
So Samira has articulated the following justificatory structure:
R3 → R2 → R1 → Q.
The arrow represents the ‘is a reason offered in favor of’ relation.
But here an issue arises. Given that Samira has produced R1, R2, 
and R3, Z is not the only possible path she might be on, because Z is 
not the only path beginning with R1, R2, R3. An infinite number of 
such paths exist. For Samira’s belief to be doxastically justified, it is 
not enough for her to be on just any path beginning that way. If she 
were, it would be pure luck that she produced the correct path’s first 
three steps. This sort of luck is perfectly compatible with proposi-
tional justification, but obviously not with doxastic justification.
We could put the point this way. Simply producing R1, R2, R3 is 
insufficient. Samira could accomplish that by lucky random guess-
ing.  She  must  properly produce  the  reasons.4 Accordingly  we 
4 Klein (2007, 6) might have this in mind when he says that doxastic jus-
tification requires believing in “an epistemically responsible manner.” 
He  doesn’t  specify  what  believing  responsibly  requires.  My  sub-
sequent discussion can be read as an examination of what form an 
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should amend IDJ.
(IDJ*): Your belief that Q is  doxastically justified just 
in case Q is propositionally justified for you, and you 
have properly provided enough reasons along at least 
one of the infinite non-repeating series of reasons, in 
virtue of which Q is propositionally justified for you, to 
satisfy the contextually determined standards.
So is Samira on the right path? Of course she is. By hypothesis 
she knows Q. And she would know Q only if she were on the right 
path.
4. A Question
But a further question arises.  In virtue of what is Samira on the 
right  path?  Why is  she  on  Z  rather  than,  say,  defective  path  A, 
whose first three steps are also R1, R2, R3?
Z: R1, R2, R3, R4Z, R5Z …
A: R1, R2, R3, R4A, R5A …
For the infinitist’s account to succeed, there of course must be a 
fact of the matter whether Samira is on Z, given that she knows Q. 
For if there is no fact of the matter whether she is on Z, then it is not 
true that she is on Z, whence it is not true that her belief is doxastic-
ally justified, whence it is not true that she knows Q.5
infinitist account of this concept might take.
5 Philipp  Keller  questioned whether  the reasoning here was careful 
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The next three sections consider some proposals for answering 
our latest question.
5. Counterfactuals
5.1.  
A tempting initial response is to go counterfactual: Samira is on Z 
because  having reached  R3,  if  she  were  to  consider  the  question 
‘Why accept that?’, then she would offer R4Z rather than R4A.
But  this  does not solve the  underlying problem.  For  there  is 
also:
A*: R1, R2, R3, R4Z, R5A …
No matter the number of steps Samira takes, there will always be an 
infinite number of defective paths that share with Z those steps, but 
then veer off into an epistemic dead-end.
enough. More fully spelled out, here is why there must be a fact of 
the matter, given that Samira knows Q:
1. Samira knows that Q only if her belief is doxastically justified. 
(Premise)
2. Samira’s belief is doxastically justified only if she is on path Z. 
(Premise)
3. She is on path Z only if it is true that she is on path Z. (Premise)
4. It is true that she is on path Z only if there is a fact of the mat-
ter whether she is on path Z. (Premise)
5. Therefore she knows that Q only if there is a fact of the matter 
whether she is on path Z. (From 1 – 4, Hypothetical Syllogism)
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5.2.  
Consider next this proposal. Samira is on Z because for  any step, 
RnZ, along Z, if Samira were to reach RnZ and consider the question 
‘Why accept that?’, then she would offer RnZ+1.
Any  proposal  featuring  counterfactuals  faces  tricky  counter-
examples. Imagine a case where we stipulate: if Samira were to reach 
R40Z and was asked ‘Why accept that?’, then some powerful agency 
would intervene and prevent her from providing R41Z. Or maybe at 
some point Samira would have a nervous breakdown or get bored 
and just stop offering further reasons. Indeed Samira is guaranteed 
to fall short of articulating the entire series because by stipulation: 
she is mortal, the number of steps in Z is infinite, providing each 
reason takes some time, and super-tasking is not an option.6 Such 
problems surely merit attention. But I think a more alarming prob-
lem suggests itself, one that cannot be dismissed as a mere trick.
To illustrate this deeper worry, it will be convenient to stipulate 
that Q is the proposition Samira would express by saying ‘I will nev-
er justify a belief beyond the 100th step’. Surely any normal human 
could know this about him or herself. (If you’re doubtful, please ad-
just the example by increasing it to whatever finite number step you 
wish.) At some point along the way—say, the 1,000th step—Samira 
would have acquired such overwhelming evidence that Q is false, 
that she would simply stop producing further reasons in favor of Q 
6 It  is  not  an option for  us  humans as  we are actually  constituted, 
which is enough for my purposes. I concede that there are possible 
beings for whom super-tasking is an option.
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because she would have stopped believing Q.
This case is more alarming than your average tricky counter-
example to a counterfactual analysis. It is more alarming because 
Samira  would  rightly stop  providing  further  reasons.  She  would 
have acquired  conclusive evidence that the belief she is ultimately 
defending is, in the counterfactual situation, false.
The example is not an isolated fluke. We could plug in different 
clauses for ‘Q’ and create the same problem. The truth-value of the 
proposition need only be sensitive to some threshold—be it the pas-
sage of time or a limit on the repetitions of some performance—that 
the  subject  would  flagrantly  violate  if  he  continued  indefinitely 
providing reasons.
For example consider the proposition I would express by saying 
‘I will not live past my 200th birthday’. Surely I know that. Yet since 
offering each reason takes at least some time, and super-tasking is 
not an option, and any justifying series contains infinite steps, at 
some point I would stop offering further reasons because I would 
recognize that I was older than 200 years. And even if I did contin-
ue offering reasons, at some point it would become irrational be-
cause I would obviously be older than 200. Imagine me at my 201st 
birthday party, still justifying my belief that I will not live past my 
200th birthday, even as I complain about how difficult it is to blow 
out all  201 candles and reminisce about how lucky I  am to have 
reached the ripe old age of 201!
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5.3.  
Consider this variant of the counterfactual proposal. Samira is on Z 
because for any step, RnZ, along Z, if she were to reach RnZ and con-
sider the question ‘Why accept that?’ and offer a reason in response, 
then she would offer RnZ+1.7
This proposal suffers the same fate. At some point it would be ir-
rational for Samira to offer any further reason in the service of justi-
fying the obviously false target belief that Q. For it would be painfully 
obvious  to  her  that  she  long,  long  ago  transcended the  100-step 
threshold, many times over.  And surely it would be surprising if a 
patently irrational counterfactual performance could generate know-
ledge or doxastic justification.
5.4.  
Consider one final revision of the counterfactual strategy. Samira is 
on Z because for any step, RnZ, along Z, if she were to reach RnZ and 
consider the question ‘Why accept that?’ and appropriately offer a 
reason in response, then she would offer RnZ+1.
Notice two things about this proposal. First, it is puzzling be-
cause it  is  difficult to imagine  appropriately offering the 1,000th, 
10,000th or 100,000,000,000th reason to support the claim that you 
will never surpass the 100-step threshold. Samira would somehow 
have to be deprived of virtually all the relevant evidence she had 
7 Peter Klein suggested this possibility in conversation. I do not know if 
he positively endorses it.
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gathered. And it would be surprising if  what Samira would do if  
deprived of nearly all the relevant evidence somehow doxastically 
justified her actual belief. Second, the revision is potentially trivial. 
In a straightforward sense it would be inappropriate to offer  any 
reason other than the correct next one in the series. For this pro-
posal  to  convince,  then,  the  relevant  sense  of  appropriateness 
would have to be explained.
6. Multiple Paths
Infinitists  might  jettison  the  misbegotten  counterfactual  strategy 
and instead respond as follows.
Return  to  the  point  where  the  problem originally  seemed to 
arise. We observed that Samira’s producing R1, R2, R3 is consistent 
with her being on either Z or A. We stipulated that she knows Q, 
which requires her to be on Z, which in turn motivated us to ask 
what makes it the case that she is on Z rather than A. But this over-
looks an important possibility: perhaps she is on both paths! And 
as long as she is on Z—regardless of whether she is also on A—her 
belief is doxastically justified. Simply producing those three reasons 
makes it the case that she is on both paths and so explains why her 
belief is doxastically justified.8
Grant that  simply producing those three reasons makes it the 
case  that  she  is  on both  paths.  The proposal  is  still  inadequate. 
Simply being on Z in the way envisioned does not suffice for doxast-
8 Thanks to an anonymous referee for suggesting this.
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ic justification. It fails to rule out even the most egregious form of 
epistemic  luck:  randomly  guessing  R1,  R2,  R3 would  suffice!  The 
imagined response essentially reverts back to IDJ, ignoring the les-
son that drove us to adopt IDJ*. This type of luck is perfectly con-
sistent with propositional justification—guessing does not deprive 
you of the reasons or stop them from propositionally justifying Q 
for you. But guessing obviously does not suffice for doxastic justific-
ation. Samira must not only be on the right path. She must be on 
the right path in the right way.
Abandoning the  “path” metaphor,  the  point is  that she must 
properly produce the relevant reasons. The present proposal offers 
no  insight  into  that  important  status,  crucial  to  the  distinction 
between propositional and doxastic justification.
7. Tu Quoque?
But is the infinitist being unfairly singled out for criticism here?9 
Does  anyone have a satisfactory account of doxastic justification? 
You might  suspect  that  infinitist  and finitist  alike  face  the  same 
problem, in which case we  have located no special problem for in-
finitism.
My response is twofold. First, if the suspicion is correct, then 
the present discussion reveals an urgent problem facing all theories 
of justification, considerably enhancing its importance. In a certain 
sense, that would please me. Nevertheless, second, the suspicion is 
9 Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this question.
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not correct. Infinitism’s competitors face no such problem in prin-
ciple.
To substantiate this last point, consider a simple foundational-
ist view, what I’ll call  simple empiricism. (I don’t here endorse 
simple empiricism, but rather deploy it to conveniently illustrate a 
point.) Simple empiricism says (i) Q is propositionally justified for 
you just in case you have an experience that Q; (ii) your belief that 
Q is doxastically justified just in case it is properly based on an ex-
perience that Q; and (iii) your belief that Q is properly based on an 
experience that Q just in case  the experience’s causing your belief 
manifests  your  cognitive  disposition  to  take  experience  at  face 
value.10 Now suppose Samira has an experience that Q. This renders 
Q propositionally justified for her. She knows Q, so her belief must 
be doxastically justified, so she must be on the right path in the 
right way. According to simple empiricism, in virtue of what is she 
on the right path in the right way? In virtue of the fact that her ex-
perience’s  causing her belief manifests her reliable cognitive dis-
position to take experience at face value.
Without ruining the basic point, the simple empiricist may add 
that for your belief to be properly based on the experience, you must 
also  cite the experience or  verbally express your acceptance of the 
experience  as  a good reason to accept Q.  This  is  in  keeping with 
Klein’s view that you must do something to earn doxastic justifica-
tion.
10 Turri (unpublished ms a) defends a related account of the epistemic 
basing relation.
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Consider also simple coherentism. (Again I do not here en-
dorse simple coherentism.) Simple coherentism says that (i) Q is 
propositionally justified for you just in case Q coheres with (some 
proper subset of) your beliefs B1 . . . Bn, where n is finite; (ii) your 
belief that Q is doxastically justified just in case it is properly based 
on B1 . . . Bn; and (iii) your belief that Q is properly based on B1 . . . 
Bn just in case B1 . . . Bn cause you to believe Q through a manifest-
ation of your cognitive disposition toward coherence. Now suppose 
that Samira holds beliefs B1 . . . Bn. This renders Q propositionally 
justified for her. She knows Q, so her belief  must be doxastically 
justified, so she must be on the right path in the right way. Accord-
ing to simple coherentism, in virtue of what is she on the right path 
in the right way? In virtue of the fact  that her beliefs B1 .  .  .  Bn 
caused her to believe Q through a manifestation of her cognitive 
disposition toward coherence.11
Again without ruining the basic point, we may add that for your 
belief to be properly based on the other beliefs, you must also  cite 
them or verbally express your acceptance of them as a good reason 
to accept Q.
8. Mimicry
Perhaps the infinitist can say Samira’s belief is doxastically justified 
11 An anonymous referee questioned whether the challenge I pose for 
infinitism stems from the fact that infinitism disallows  non-beliefs to 
play the role of reasons. The discussion of simple coherentism puts 
this worry to rest because it disallows non-beliefs to play that role.
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in virtue of the fact that her production of R1, R2, R3 manifests her 
relevant cognitive dispositions.
The main task facing this proposal is  to identify the relevant 
dispositions. We know what it is to be disposed to take experience 
at face value—we  do it all the time. We know what it is to trust co-
herence—we do that every time we accept some conclusion because 
it “fits” with what we already believe. What dispositions will the in-
finitist invoke?
But this task isn’t so difficult after all.  The infinitist can help 
himself to whatever dispositions his opponents help themselves to.12 
Or  he  might  “go  contextualist”  about  the  relevant  dispositions: 
along with contextual standards determining what is admissible as 
a bedrock reason, contextual standards also determine what counts 
as an admissible cognitive disposition. Either way, a penchant to 
just guess will almost certainly not show up on the list of relevant 
dispositions.
9. Conclusion
Where does this leave us? We asked, In virtue of what is Samira on 
the right path in the right way?, or less metaphorically, In virtue of 
what has Samira properly produced the relevant reasons? The in-
finitist can respond: in virtue of the fact that Samira’s production of 
12 Klein (2005a, 136 – 7) makes a parallel suggestion regarding an infin-
itist account of  what makes something a (good) reason for you to 
begin with.
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R1,  R2,  R3 actually  manifests  her  relevant  cognitive  dispositions, 
whatever those dispositions may be.
This proposal is not ad hoc. It does not violate infinitism’s other 
commitments.  Invoking  the  manifestation  of  cognitive  traits  is 
equally available to foundationalist, coherentist and infinitist alike. 
At the very least, the infinitist appears to have just as plausible a 
story to tell as her competitors. True, we might want a more com-
plete story about what the manifestation of dispositions requires. 
But infinitism suffers no relative disadvantage as a result. And it is 
something we would have wanted in any case because the manifest-
ation of dispositions is pervasive throughout the physical and social 
world.
I conclude that we have identified a plausible infinitist account 
of doxastic justification, including what distinguishes it from pro-
positional justification. Of course this does not answer all questions 
about infinitism. There remain serious questions about the main 
positive  arguments  for  infinitism.13 There  also  remain  questions 
about the contextualist element of IDJ*. But those are issues for an-
other day. For now infinitists can take heart in our present results.14
13 For discussion of Klein’s “regress argument” see Turri 2009; for discus-
sion of Fantl’s “features argument” see Turri (unpublished ms b).
14 For superb feedback that helped improve this paper, I thank the ed-
itors of this journal (along with any anonymous referees who helped 
them in the process). Special thanks also to Peter Klein for helpful dis-
cussion early on.
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